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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING 
A complete list of all parties to this 
proceeding in the lower court is contained in the caption 
of the case upon appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court 
by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit error by 
denying appellant's motion to exclude from evidence the 
appellant's prior felony convictions? 
2. Did the trial court deny appellant due 
process in failing to grant the appellant's motion to 
suppress the eyewitness identification of appellant by 
various witnesses? 
3. Did the trial court commit error by 
refusing to grant appellant's motion for a mistrial on the 
basis of jury misconduct? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Section 76-6-302 (1953 as amended); Article I, Section 
7 Utah Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 12, 1990, a jury convicted appellant 
of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-302. On October 5, 
1990 the appellant was sentenced to serve a term of five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison and to an additional 
year firearm enhancement to run consecutively, (R.-00247) 
-1-
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On July 16, 1990 appellant was also convicted 
on the habitual criminal enhancement allegations. That 
sentenced merged with the aggravated robbery sentence. 
(R.-00245) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 18, 1989 a business known as Taco 
Bell was robbed by a man with a ski mask covering his face. 
On August 22, 1989, four days after the Taco 
Bell robbery, four of the witnesses who testified at 
defendant's trial were shown a group of six photographs, of 
which defendant's photo was number four. The original 
description of the robber was a male with a mustache and 
blue eyes. 
Trista Valdez testified that only two men in 
the photographs had blue eyes and these were the only two she 
considered. She identified number six, not the defendant. 
(T. 52) 
Randy Orvin identified the defendant in the 
photo spread. (T. 96) 
Lance Ewing identified the defendant in the 
photo spread. (T. 156) 
Jerod Stern picked number two and number four 
in the photo spread. (T.199) 
On September 15, 1989 a line up was conducted 
with seven participants. Defendant Walker was in position 
number four. (Ex. S-41) The four witnesses mentioned above 
\ 
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were instructed that if they recognized the person who robbed 
Taco Bell, to put the number in the box on the front of the 
card. They were instructed that if they believed they was 
the robber but were not certain, they were to write the 
number on the back of the card. (Line-up Transcript p. 12) 
Trista Valdez wrote nothing on the front and 
number two on the back. (T. 13, 14) She did not pick the 
defendant. Jerod Stern wrote nothing on the front and number 
four on the back. Randy Orvin wrote nothing on the front 
and number four on the back. Lance Ewing wrote nothing on 
the front and number four on the back. 
On December 12, 1989 a second line-up was 
conducted with eight men. Defendant Walker was number two. 
Jerod Stern, Trista Valdez and Lance Ewing were present. 
The witnesses were instructed that if they could make a 
positive identification they were to write the number in the 
box on front of the card. (Line-up Transcript, p. 13) All 
of the men had masks covering their faces. All were 
instructed to repeat the same statements. The witnesses 
were told that if they could make a probable or possible 
identification to write the number on the back of the card. 
(Line-up Transcript, p. 18) 
Lance Ewing wrote a zero on the front and 
nothing on the back. Trista Valdez wrote nothing on the 
front and number seven on the back. Jerod Stern wrote 
-3-
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nothing on the front and number two on the back. (Line-up 
Transcript, p. 18) 
The men in the line-up were then told to leave 
the roomf remove their masks and come back in. A short 
recess was taken in which defendant Walker requested his 
attorney to object to the mask being removed. (Line-up 
Transcript, p. 19) No such objection was made by his 
attorney. The witnesses were told if they could not make 
a positive identification to put a zero on the front of the 
card. They were told that if they recognized someone to put 
that person's number on the back of the card. (Line-up 
Transcript, p. 21) 
Trista Valdez put zero on the front of the 
card and number two on the back. Lance Ewing put zero on 
the front and nothing on the back. Jerod Stern put number 
two on the front and nothing on the back. (Line-up Tran-
script, p. 21 ) . 
On December 13, 1989 Trista Valdez and Jerod 
Stern testified at a preliminary hearing at which the 
defendant was present. Stern identified the defendant. 
(T. 208-209) 
At the trial Trista Valdez was unable to 
positively identify the defendant as the robber. (T. 69) 
Randy Orvin identified the defendant at trial as the robber. 
(T. 90). Lance Ewing identified the defendant at trial 
as the robber. Jerod Stern identifed the defendant at 
trial as the robber. 
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POINT I 
The defendant filed a motion under U.R.E. 
609 to preclude the state from presenting evidence at trial 
of prior convictions of the defendant. The court, on 
April 23, 1990 held a hearing on the motion and ruled that 
the 1982 robbery conviction and a 1981 deadly weapon 
conviction were admissible in evidence. 
"It is punishable by more than a year 
imprisonment. It is less than 10 years 
old. Although it is somewhat prejudicial, it 
is same-the same kind of crime as this one, I 
find the prejudicial effect is not outweighed 
by the probative value. The robbery charge of 
December 1982 will be admitted. That's also 
true of the deadly weapon charge of February 
1981. Again that's punishable by more than a 
year in prison. It is less than 10 years old 
and is admissible under 6009, as I understand 
it, unless I find that prejudicial effect 
outweighs the probative value, which I don't so 
in summary, those two convictions, the two 
felonies, will be admitted. (Motion Hearing T. 
14-15). 
In May of 1990 the defendant filed an 
1 
objection to the above ruling of the court and cited 
additional arguments in support of exclusion of the two 
felony convictions, especially the case of State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). There was no change in the 
court's original ruling allowing the felony convictions. 
1. The objection refers to "two 1988 robbery convictions" 
These two convictions, if they exist, were not considered 
by the court and were not mentioned in the court's ruling 
of April 23, 1990. 
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On July 12, 1990 after the state had rested 
and prior to the conclusion of the defendant's case in 
chief, the defendant, on advice of counsel, decided not to 
testify in his own behalf. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TWO PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS OF THE 
DEFENDANT WERE INADMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 609 
Rule 609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Provides: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during cross= 
examination but only if the crime, (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the
 x 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (1) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
In the instant case, the two felony 
convictions were found admissible under subsection one. 
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 
1988) the Court of Appeals defined the standard of review 
applicable in this case as follows: 
"In reviewing evidentiary rulings, we 'will 
not reverse the trial court's ruling on 
evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that 
the court so abused its discretion that there 
is a likelihood that injustice resulted.'" 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 
1987). Wight at 16. 
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It is defendant's position that the ruling 
of the trial court was clearly erroneous and the effect of 
the ruling in essentially coercing the defendant into 
relinquishing his right to testify in his own behalff 
created a great likelihood that injustice resulted. 
In State v. Bannery supra, this court deline-
ated the factors to be considered in evaluating the 
admissibility of evidence under subsection one of Rule 609. 
Those factors are: 
(1) the nature of the crime, as bearing on 
the character for veracity of the witness. 
(2) the recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction... 
(3) the similarity of the prior crime to the 
charge crime, insofar as a close resemblance 
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a 
bad person. 
(4) the importance or credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution trial 
without decisive non-testimonial evidence... 
(5) the importance of the accused's testimony 
as perhaps warranting the exclusion of 
convictions probative of the accused's 
character for veracity... 
In arriving at a ruling on the admissibility 
of the 1982 deadly weapon conviction, it does not appear 
that the court weighed any of the Banner factors. The court 
dealt only with the more than one year issue and whether the 
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. 
If the court had conducted an inquiry into the 
factors set forth in Bannery supray it seems clear that both 
of the prior convictions should have been ruled inadmissible. 
-7-
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A. 
THE NATURE OF THE CRIME - NEXUS TO VERACITY. 
In Bannery supra, the court held that the 
crime of assault with intent to commit rape did not 
inherently reflect on defendant's character for truth and 
veracity. In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987) 
the court held: 
"The crime of rape does not inherently 
reflect on defendant's character for truth and 
veracity... likewise, the convictions for 
escape should have been excluded because of... 
the complete lack of connection between the 
crime of escape and defendant's veracity." at 
Under Banner and Gentry, supra, the 
convictions of robbery and deadly weapon have a complete 
lack of connection to the defendant's veracity. 
B . • 
RECENTNESS OR REMOTENESS OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION. 
In this case, the two convictions were eight 
and nine years old at the time of trial. In Banner, supra, 
the court stated: 
"Particularly significant in our balancing 
process is the remoteness of the prior 
convictions...the convictions at the time 
of defendant's trial were between eight and 
nine plus years old." at 1335 
In Gentry, supra, the court stated: 
"The rape conviction was ten years old at the 
time of this trial. The conviction's remote-
ness is a measure of its negligible probative 
value." at 3307 . < 
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c. 
THE SIMILARITY OF THE PRIOR CRIME TO THE 
CHARGED CRIMEr INSOFAR AS A CLOSE RESEMBLANCE MAY LEAD THE 
JURY TO PUNISH THE ACCUSED AS A BAD PERSON. 
In this case, the defendant was convicted 
of aggravated robbery, with the use of a gun. The two 
felonies admitted are almost identicalr i.e. robbery and 
possession of a dangerous weaponf to the crime charged. 
In Bannery supray wherein the defendant was 
charged with sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of a child, 
the court stated: 
"The convictions were for assault with 
intent to commit rape. Such convictions 
would be extremely prejudicial and tend to 
inflame the jury in any case dealing with 
sexual crimes..." at 1335 
The defendant would submit that the two 
convictions in his case were even more similar than were the 
Banner convictions and therefore more prejudicial. 
D. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBILITY ISSUES IN 
DETERMINING THE TRUTH IN A PROSECUTION TRIED WITHOUT DECISIVE 
NON-TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE. 
AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACCUSED'S TESTIMONY, 
AS PERHAPS WARRANTING THE EXCLUSION OF CONVICTIONS PROBATIVE 
OF THE ACCUSED'S CHARACTER FOR VERACITY. 
It seems appropriate to discuss factors four 
and five together in this particular case. The reason being 
-9-
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that they essentially merge together. 
In this case the decisive evidence was the 
various eyewitnesses identification testimony. There was 
essentially no decisive non-testimonial evidence. In 
addition there were no convictions probative of the 
defendant's character for veracity to exclude. What is left 
then of factors four and fivef are (1) the importance of 
credibility issues in determining the truth; and (2) the 
importance of the accused's testimony. 
The teachings of Banner and Gentry are equally 
applicable to this case where the only credible evidence to 
offer against the eyewitnesses testimony would have been the 
testimony of Thayne Walker. 
In Banner, supra, the court noted: 
"Finally, the accused's testimony and the 
importance of credibility in this case were 
critical in determining which version of the 
facts was correct since the prosecutor's 
case included no decisive non-testimonial 
evidence." at 1335 . 
In Gentryy supra, the court observed: 
"Finally, the State relied upon the 
testimonial evidence offered by the victim 
to establish the defendant's guilt. 
Defendant's testimony would have been 
probative regarding the victim's credibility 
and possibly influential in the trial's 
outcome." at 1037-38. 
In summary, it is the position of the 
defendant that based on the balancing test prescribed by 
-10- i 
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Banner, supra, the prior convictions should have been 
excluded. 
POINT IA 
THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSIDERED A WAIVER OF THE RULE 609 ISSUE. 
It seems clear that the law in Utah as set 
forth in Gentry, supra, is that in order to preserve a 
defendant's objection to a Rule 609 ruling, a defendant 
must in fact testify. 
However, in this case, appellant Walker would 
submit that such a failure should not be deemed a waiver.-
Walker's position is that his decision to not testify was a 
result of a combination of inaccurate advice by both his 
counsel and the trial judge. 
At the end of the defendant's case in chief, 
the following discussion took place between the court, 
counsel and the defendant: 
Judge Daniels: And other than that do you have any 
other witnesses? 
Ms. Bowman: I don't believe we do, your Honor. 
And I should indicate that Mr. Donaldson and I and 
Thayne have talked at length about his right to testify 
and indicated to him that he has an absolute right to 
testify. We both advised him not to testify based upon 
what's come in and what we have argued. And I believe 
he's willing to accept and follow that advice. He 
-11-
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certainly was concerned about testifying to 
preserve the 609 issue. And that's a concern 
as ours as wellf but I think that given your 
ruling on the 609 issue that would be very, 
very risky. 
Judge Daniels: All right. You understand then, 
Mr. Walker, you do have a right to testify. 
Mr. Walker: Yes, I do. 
Judge Daniels: And you also have a right not to 
testify. And you have the choice to make and you have 
chosen not to under the circumstances; is that right? • * 
Mr. Walker: Right. 
Judge Daniels: Now, I understand, and I guess 
the record should clearly reflect, that one of the 
reasons that you've made that decision is because of my 
ruling on the question of whether prior convictions 
could be brought up. And your attorneys, of course, 
have objected to my ruling on that and established on 
the record at considerable length, and also in a motion 
to reconsider, that you object to that. And I under-
stand that your decision is based, in part, on that 
ruling and that's preserved for appeal. 
Does that sufficiently cover that, Ms. Bowman? 
Ms. Bowman: I guess I should add, its our opinion 
that the case law would probably require him to testify 
i 
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and the two lineups. This motion was based on the theory 
that the three identification procedures were unnecessarily 
suggestive and a violation of the defendant's due process 
rights. The motion also attacked the reliability of the 
procedures and resulting identification. 
On May 16, 1990 the appellant, through his 
attorneys, filed another motion to suppress the results 
of the identification procedures. The basis of the motion 
as that the procedures employed were unduly suggestive in 
violation of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
(R.-00050) On May 22, 1990 the court, in a minute entry, 
based on the arguments of counsel and the defendant, denied 
the motion to suppress. 
The trial court made no factual findings and 
the only legal conclusions were that the motions be denied. 
It is the contention of the appellant that 
he was denied due process when the prosecution was allowed to 
introduce the identification of him as the gunman. It is 
appellant's contention that the circumstances surrounding the 
identification rendered it totally unreliable. The defendant 
further contends that (1) the trial court did not conduct an 
analysis of the circumstances of the identification as is 
required by State v. Ramierez, 157 Utah Adv. Rpts. 10 (1991) 
and (2) such an analysis of the procedures employed and the 
-14-
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D. Was the witnesses1 identification made 
spontaneouslyf did it remain consistent thereafter, 
or was it a product of suggestion. 
Although the witnesses did not see the 
gunman's facef they describe him as having blue eyes and a 
mustache. In the photographic array only two of the 
photos had blue eyesf one of these being the defendant. 
Approximately one montht after the robbery the 
witnesses observed a lineup involving seven men with masks. 
The defendant was the only man from the photo spread 
participating in the lineup. None of the witnesses could 
positively identify any of the seven as being the robber. 
(Ex. S-3-56) 
Approximately two months after the first lineup 
another lineup was held with eight men. Again the 
defendant was the only man from the photo spread. With the 
mask on, none of the three witnesses could positively 
identify the defendant. (Ex. S-10-5-13) Only one, Jarold 
Stern indicated the defendant as possibly being the robber. 
(Ex. S-13) After the masks were removed only Stern was able 
to positively identify the defendant. (Ex. S-14) Valdez 
indicated on the back of the card that the defendant was 
someone she recognized. (Ex. S-12) 
It is defendant's contention that (1) having 
only two men with blue eyes in the photographic array limited 
the reliable choices of the witnesses and (2) that it was 
suggestive in the extreme to have two lineups, each with 
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requests that the court reverse his conviction and remand 
the matter for a new trial. 
DATED this day of Novemberf 1991. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to the office of 
the Attorney General for the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this day of 
November, 1991. 
i 
i 
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